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Abstract
The main viewpoint related to privatisation is concerned with the aim of verifying the
presence of incentive mechanisms on the managerial behaviour. This paper, differently
from other earlier studies on this topic, is aimed to study, with an econometric approach,
the dynamic of economic performance in the years before privatisation, over a sample
of Italian privatised firms in the last decade. The results show an interesting growth in
the productivity levels in the four years preceding the shift from public to private
ownership. This suggests that other mechanisms than property rights influence
managerial efforts. The main source of such improvement can be attributed to the labour
factor, in agreement with many theoretical and empirical studies.
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1. Introduction
One of the most significant political decision of the last two decades has been the
privatisation of State-owned firms. This orientation is mainly explained by efficiency
reasons, since it is generally considered that private firms perform better in term of
productivity than public ones, with positive relapses on prices of products and services
(Zanetti and Alzona 1998). The privatisation policy was accompanied and matched with
other political interventions such as liberalisation, deregulation, set in a general process
of markets integration. The constraints imposed on public finances by the European
unification then has induced the government to sell public enterprises, al least these
ones with smaller strategic relevance for public objectives. The privatisation processes
have interested almost the totality of industrialised and developing countries, especially
the Great Britain.
The economic literature highlights as under private ownership more effective
incentive mechanisms operate on managerial and workers efforts, so as to reduce slacks
and overcome the difficulties in control, arising from asymmetric information. There is,
however, some evidence of increasing performance before privatisation takes place, so
demonstrating how productivity can enhance even when firms are controlled by State
officers. The suggestion is that the announcement of privatisation can work as a threat
for public managers and, thus, as an indirect incentive mechanism that leaves out of
consideration the issue of enforcing complete contracts.
This paper is aimed to verify a similar evidence by using a panel data of Italian
firms. Section 2 introduces the theoretical framework, section 3 shows the main
empirical evidences, section 4 describes the dataset while section 5 introduces the
econometric models used. The results are presented in section 6 and section 7 concludes
the paper.
2. Theoretical framework
2.1. Traditional Literature
The main viewpoint related to privatisation is concerned with the aim of verifying
the presence of incentive mechanisms on the managerial behaviour. Traditionally most
theoretical and empirical works have taken into account the efficiency levels of newly-
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privatised firms between the years following the privatisation and the previous ones
(Boussofiane, Martin and Parker, 1997; Dunsire, Hartley and Parker, 1991; Fraquelli
and Fabbri, 1998; Fraquelli and Erbetta, 2000; Hartley, Martin and Parker, 1991; Haskel
and Szymanski, 1993a; Hutchinson, 1991; Megginson, Nash and Van Randenborgh,
1994). Other studies have moreover compared performances indicators, such as
productivity and profitability, for publicly versus privately-owned firms (De Fraja,
1993; Dewenter and Malatesta, 1998; Pint, 1991; Schmidt, 1996).
The approaches that most directly bear on privatisation are these of property
rights, principal agent and public choice (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Bös, 1991;
Tittenbrun, 1996; Villalonga, 2000). Each of them suggests explanatory keys for the
evaluation of the impact of privatisation. We will discuss them briefly.
The property rights theory argues that different ownership arrangements can lead
to differential incentives on the economic behaviour of the firm. The basic proposition
underlying this pattern is that the residual claims of control (that is, the right to
appropriate the returns from the assets) represent a strong incentive towards the
enhancement of efficiency (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990, Hart,
1990). Removing the property rights away from the public control could impact
positively on productive performance and innovation. According to this theory,
incentive mechanisms can work through two typical threats characterising the market
for corporate control: the risks of take-over1 and bankruptcy (Kay and Thompson, 1986;
Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Trento, 1992; Barca, 1994). In both the cases, a decreasing
value of the firm could flow into a replacement of the management, judged unable for
the business strategy, by incumbent raiders (take-over) or by the market itself
(bankruptcy)2.
The principal-agent theory shifts its attention on the separation between
ownership and control (this latter, exercised by the management). If such an issue
occurs, the managers will seek to exploit their informative advantage for the
maximisation of slacks rather than profit. In this context, a private ownership is
considered to be able to reduce the moral hazard issue (Bös, 1991; Martin and Parker,
1997).
The public choice theory’s argument lies in bureaucratic behaviours by public
officials. They will try to maximise their own political utility, that is the consensus of
voting citizens, rather than the public interest3. In fact, the information about the actual
                                                
1 In the literature there are also some arguments that contrast with the actual threatening of the take-over
(Tirole, 1988; Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Trento, 1992).
2 Both these factors suppose that there is a strong identification between ownership and control.
3 For instance, the bureaucrats will satisfy the union’s requests as largely as possible. In fact, some
theoretical and empirical evidences suggest  that state-owned firms results generally overmanning
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internal efficiency condition is not available by taxpayers but paying high political
transaction costs. In such a context, it can be included the matter of the so called soft
budget constraint. This latter allows the publicly-owned firms to enjoy of easy subsidies
from the government4.
2.2. Theoretical background for the pre-privatisation behaviour
In the economic literature there are numerous works relating to the perspectives of
privatisation in the years following the dismissal of public assets, but few analyses
focus on the effects of the announcement to both managers’ or workers’ behaviours
before privatisation. So the theoretical framework draws necessarily from the traditional
explanation models discussed above.
Vickers and Yarrow (1988) suggest that the capital market discipline through
take-over can result in an uncertain effect upon the internal efficiency of the target
firms. It depends on the expectations of the managers. Let x be the effort level, U(x) the
managerial utility as negative function of the effort (so that dU/dx<0). Assume further
that the probability that take-over occurs in the period between t and t+dt is h(x,)dt
(with dh/dx<0), where  is an outside parameter capturing the elasticity of take-over
likelihood to changes in effort. The present value of the expected utility for the
management (assuming the discount rate be r) is:
[2.2.1]
Maximising this expression with respect to x and equalling to 0, it can be obtained
the following first-order condition:
[2.2.2]
This latter equation states that at the optimal level of effort the marginal increase
in managerial utility is equal to the marginal increase in the present value of the
probability of becoming a take-over victim. This latter equilibrium condition is depicted
in figure 2.2.1 by the x*.
                                                                                                                                              
(Pint, 1991; Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1996; Dewenter and Malatesta (1998); but for a contrasting
opinion, Megginson, Nash and Van Randenborgh, 1994).
4
 As shown by the empirical results of Bertero and Rondi (2000), the passage from a soft to a hard
budget constraint system leads to a more careful use of the resources by the management. The
hardening of the budget control by the government is, however, quite difficult (Schmidt, 1996).
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Figure 2.2.1 Take-over threats and managerial effort (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988, p. 20)
To assess the lonely impact of tightening conditions in the market for corporate
control, it can be considered a change in the parameter . If   increases, reflecting a
harder market discipline, the implications for the inside efficiency are not unambiguous.
Indeed, a higher value of   raises the denominator in the expression on the right-hand
side of (2.2.2), then shifting upwards the corresponding curve. Nevertheless, a greater
take-over threat is naturally expected to enhance the probability of take-over for any
given level of effort, so shifting the curve downwards. Thus, the equilibrium point x*
move on the right or on the left, according to the prevailing effect. Intuitively, a greater
fear of take-over can induce the most shirking managers (that will be more likely laid-
off by the new shareholders) to improve their discount rate, r+h(x, ), and seek to
maximise their utility as long as they are in the control of the firm. On the other hand,
the most capable managers (that will probably maintain their office into the firm) will
try to accrue the control of efficiency because they perceive that any relaxing will be
punished more heavily by the market. This pattern suggests that a more active market
for corporate control may lead even to adverse selection solutions associated with lower
internal efficiency.
It can be noted that the role of expectations is not of secondary importance
because both the types of managers anticipate their future perspectives into the firm. To
our aims, it can be possible to substitute the actual   with its expected value  e,
observed by the public managers themselves5, without losses in the meaning of this
pattern.
The authors in their work have developed an analogous model with respect to
bankruptcy risk. In this case, the first-order condition will be:
                                                
5 The role of expectations of public managers is highlighted by Aghion, Blanchard and Burgess (1994)
and by Riechmann (1996), whose arguments will be discussed later.
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[2.2.3]
where F(D-) is the probability function of bankruptcy that depends on the spread
between the level of debt (D) and the market value of the firm ((x)). When the risk of
economic collapse of the firm raises, particularly if the industry experiments with
periods of recession or more intensive product market competition, the effect on the
internal effort will be again ambiguous. Once more, the expected increasing in the
probability of going out of business could be anticipated by the officials of state-owned
firms before privatisation, especially if the public sector underwent restructuring or
liberalisation processes by policy makers. As a support of the positive impact of the
financial pressures on state-owned firms, Bertero and Rondi (2000) show that a passage
from a soft to a hard budget constraint, in the Italian public context, implied increase in
total productivity and reduction in employment used. The role of soft budget constraint
is particularly active when considering small public firms that compete with small
private firms (Kay and Thompson, 1986). In such a context, the presence of easy
subsidies from the government to state-owned enterprises can work as a strong
alteration of the competitive system, with negative consequences on the efficiency
performances of these latter (Schmidt, 1996; Trento, 1992).
These arguments show the consequences of environmental changes on the
probable behaviour of managers of public firms. Moreover the provided explanations do
not treat thoroughly the factors conditioning the choice of managers about their effort.
With regard to this issue, Aghion, Blanchard and Burgess (1994) have studied the
incentive schemes working when the public managers have to decide about the
opportunity of restructuring and unbundling before privatisation occurs. They found that
the perspective of job loss in the future and poor payment systems not based upon
economic results (i.e., no reservation to the managers of stakes in the privatised
companies) represent strong disincentives for restructuring process. Their base model
focuses on the alternative choice between restructuring or maintaining the status quo
and develops over an horizon of two periods. Furthermore, they suppose that both
strategies are implemented by acting on the employment level6.
The status quo strategy is associated with employment equal to N in the first
period and to N(1-y) in the future period (due to a loss in competitiveness), with y>0. At
contrary, the restructuring/unbundling strategy means a labour shedding in the current
period followed by a recovery in the employment level in the future period. The final
result is equal to N(1-x+z) where x>0 and z can assume two values corresponding to the
                                                
6 The utility function of public managers is supposed be correlated with the employment level, because
this latter could be interpreted as a synonym of prestige (Pint, 1991).
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(bad and good) states of the world: z and z both with probability 1/2. According to the
authors, under these assumptions, the restructuring option will be socially convenient if
the amount of employment on both the two periods exceeds the overall workforce in the
case of status quo, thus if:
N x E z N y( ( )) ( )2 2 2    [2.2.4]
or equivalently:
E z x y( )  2 [2.2.5]
When introducing an horizon of privatisation, the public managers will be more
prudent in committing themselves in restructuring process because they could not
witness the results of their effort. Indeed, privatisation could break off their contract
with the state firm before restructuring shows its beneficial consequences. Let  be the
probability that privatisation takes place between the current and the future period, the
optimal rule for undertaking restructuring becomes as follows:
E z x y( ) (( ) / ( ))   2 1  [2.2.6]
As can be seen, if =0, that is if privatisation will occur after restructuring has
produced its outcomes, the (2.2.6) turns out to be equal to the (2.2.5). Instead if =1, the
incentive is definitely shifted towards the status quo strategy. In summary, as higher the
likelihood coefficient  as stronger the willing of not restructuring will be, even if a
restructuring project would be socially optimal7. The main intuition underlying this
model is that, if the horizon of privatisation for the management is long enough, through
restructuring the (good) manager reveals to the market his ability and will be more
likely to be offered a better job elsewhere. At contrary, if this horizon is too short, then
the market will not be able to evaluate which share of the future efficiency gain can be
assigned to the manager’s action8. These arguments suggest that active behaviours from
public officials depend upon how the policy makers plan the timing of privatisation, the
                                                
7 When introducing into the pattern the possibility for the managers of gaining a share a of the newly-
privatised firm, and supposing that l assumes a positive value, the authors demonstrate that the good
managers are once more biased against restructuring even where this latter would be socially optimal.
Moreover, it can be shown that the workers play a role counteracting the restructuring choice. In fact,
they care about solely their current employment and not the perspectives linked to parameter z. If the
restructuring is uncertain enough, the workers will surely hinder that that project takes place. However
a passage from a soft to a hard budget constraint for those firms that maintain the status quo, improve
unambiguously the probability that restructuring occurs (Aghion, Blanchard and Burgess, 1994).
8
 Siebert (1994) argues that the restructuring policy can not be supported solely by incentive
mechanisms on managerial activity, but needs also new capital.
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actual expectations of managers9, the composition of the managerial teams10 (Estrin,
1994), other then the organisational structures of the firms.
Riechmann (1996), developing the previous pattern, has studied the possibility of
pre-privatisation restructuring by applying a game method. According to Riechmann,
restructuring of publicly-owned firms is possible after the announcement of the
intention of privatisation by the government. Its extent, however, depends upon the
expectations of public managers about the level of subsidies that the policy makers will
grant in the future for sustaining the employment11. Soft budget constraints can thus
hinder the increase in efficiency before privatisation takes place, because of the
maintenance of status quo. A more credible commitment of the government can lead the
firms to prefer restructuring strategy, for instance, by a faster transaction towards
privatisation or by a more thorough change in organisational status.
The consequences of privatisation or changes towards more profit-orientated
objectives on employment and wages are discussed in Haskel and Szymanski (1993b)
by a bargaining model that considers the managers/workers relation. Their results,
obtained considering especially public utilities, suggest that shifting towards private
ownership or changes in objectives into the public sector lower employment and wages.
The former effect is due to a reduction in output level that follows a sharper orientation
towards commercial aims (but such a shrinkage is upset by a possible reduction in
market power, that frequently is associated with privatisation policies). The latter effect
is associated with a reduction in the surplus12 over which the unions bargain and a
decreasing care the government puts on the unions’ power (such a condition is fed by
the potential liberalisation effect). It can be assumed that the consequences of changes
in strategic objectives of publicly-owned firms follow the announcement of
privatisation, so that there is the matter for a pre-privatisation increase in internal
efficiency.
Another reason that could explain an increasing efficiency before privatisation
occurs is related with the exigencies of public finance (Jones, Tandon and Vogelsang,
1990). The government is naturally oriented to maximise the value of the assets sold to
the private investors. If the financial market is well-functioning, it will translate the
                                                
9 In such a context becomes relevant the role of credibility of the commitment of government. If the
credibility were quite weak, an issue of time-inconsistency would arises (Riechmann, 1996).
10 This means that the signalling role of the managerial capacity to the market will be more intense the
greater the percentage of good managers into the command teams.
11 The Riechmann’s hypothesis is that the government can choose between the strategy of announcing a
privatisation programme and than continuing to subsidise the public firms that do not restructure or
applying a total hard budget constraint with no grant of subsidies. The first solution is the dominant
one.
12 This surplus has to be interpreted s the capacity of the firm of paying its workers, that is available
funds.
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perspectives of increasing in performances into the present prices of shares. So
restructuring processes before privatisation, by public officials, can be induced by the
government itself, for giving the firm a better strategic position when it will work
without state protections.
3. Empirical framework
The aim of this work is to evaluate the impact of the threat of the privatisation
programme on the productivity dimension, in particular before the dismissal itself takes
place. There is some evidence from the British context that the government picked out
for privatisation those public firms that already experienced a growing performance
(Villalonga, 2000). In this way is uncertain if the increase in efficiency can be consider
as exogenous or, alternatively, is due to the announcement of privatisation. Bertero and
Rondi (2000), although in a different context, have demonstrated through an analysis of
a panel of Italian public firms, that when a shift from a regime of soft to one of hard
budget constrain takes place, the managers became more aware in avoiding drops in
productivity, as well as more sensitive to the financial debt variable. In particular there
is evidence of a strong reduction in work-force levels. This fact arises the question
about the capacity of the public firms of reducing inefficient utilization of their
resources. These results are in accordance with Fraquelli and Erbetta (2000) who
showed an increasing trend in efficiency DEA scores before privatisation, for medium-
sized Italian privatised manufacturing firms, attributable, in first instance, to large cuts
in employment dimension. Another evidence of consistent correction in labour input
factor is included in Fraquelli and Fabbri (1998).
Villalonga (2000), in a longitudinal study of 24 Spanish firms, presents an
estimated model in which the hypothesis of relevance of time period on the effects of
privatisation on efficiency is tested. In fact, the results emphasize an increase in
efficiency for years 7 and 8 after privatisations as well as a reduction in previous years 5
and 6. The same analysis highlights a significant recovery in efficiency in years 3 and 4
before privatisation, even if a similar behaviour is not noted for the years closer to
privatisation. A stronger evidence of such an outcome is proposed by Fraquelli (2001),
again on the Italian case. When analysing, by the use of Törnqvist indices of total factor
productivity (TFP), the author reveals increasing performances in the years preceding
the privatisation. This latter outcome is explained, in according with theoretical
observations, by a weaker interference of political bureaucracy and especially by a
Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N° 11/2001
15
sharper risk, perceived by public managers, of job loss13. This fact leads public officers
to reveal their actual capacity, in such a way as to qualify themselves onto the labour
market. An externality mechanism can play a positive role in the increasing of
efficiency of the firms under privatisation, insofar as it makes feasible the reduction of
inefficiency slacks due to asymmetric information.
These outcomes emerging from the Spanish and mainly Italian market are
somewhat confirmed by the British experience. The UK can be considered as the
country where the policy of privatisation has been carried out in a radical manner during
the ‘80s and ‘90s. So the comparison with this reality becomes fundamental and
inevitable for each research of this type. Parker and Martin (1995) in analysing 11 firms
transferred from public to private control in the UK over the ‘80s show that the run-up
of privatisation is associated with improvement in total and mainly in labour
productivity. This work complements earlier findings of Molyneaux and Thompson
(1987), Vickers and Yarrow (1988), Hutchinson (1991), Bishop and Thompson (1992).
The fact that the performance increases markedly before privatisation suggests the
question of feasible incentive schemes even under public control.
4. Settlement of the sample and dataset
The data used for the estimation are directly extracted from the balance sheets of
23 large Italian firms, partially or totally privatised over the last decade, and collected in
an unbalanced panel covering the period from 1983 to 1998, for a total number of 350
firm-year observations. While the final period of the time series is common to the entire
sample, the initial one differs across the firms14. Company names, years of privatisation
and length of each time series are reported in table 1. All the data used for the
econometric model were deflated to the 1983. The choice of both beginning the series
and utilising the price system at 1983 year depends on the fact that in the analysed
period all the firms of the sample were subjected to revaluation of the stock of fixed
asset and depreciation fund, on the basis of the law 72/1983. This latter allows for
considering the balance fixed asset values of this year as reliable starting points for
building up deflated physical capital time series.
                                                
13 This aspect can be viewed as a possible consequence of a regime of harder budget control.
14 When the companies underwent mergers or acquisitions so as to make impossible any comparison
between the preceding and subsequent time series, the time period was opportunely truncated in such
a way as to render homogeneous the accounting data.
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Table 1 – List of firms of the sample (a)
COMPANY NAME PRIVATISATION YEAR (b) TIME SERIES
CEMENTIR 1992 1983-98
ENEL 1999 1983-98
AUTOSTRADE 1999 1983-98
FINMECCANICA 1999 1990-98
ACEA 1999 1987-98
AEROPORTI DI ROMA 1999 1983-98
AEM MILANO 1998 1983-98
AEM TORINO 2000 1983-98
NUOVO PIGNONE 1994 1983-98
MONTEFIBRE 1996 1986-98
SNAM 1996 1983-98
AUTOGRILL 1995 1983-98
ALITALIA 1998 1983-98
ANSALDO 1990 1983-98
AMGA GENOVA 1996 1987-98
TELECOM 1999 1983-98
ITALDATA 1985 1983-98
RECORDATI 1985 1983-98
STAR 1985 1983-98
TIRSOTEX 1988 1983-98
SIV 1993 1983-98
TUBI GHISA 1993 1983-98
ALCANTARA 1994 1983-98
(a) All the monetary figures are deflated in 1983 pounds, even for those firms whose time series begin after 1983
(ACEA, 1987; AMGA, 1987; FINMECCANICA, 1990; MONTEFIBRE, 1986)
(b) The years refer on the begin of privatisation programme.
The selection of the variables and the respective techniques of deflation will be
briefly commented in the present section. More precise details can be found in the
appendix A at the end of this paper.
Turnover output measure was calculated by multiplying physical dimensions of
output by a base 1983 price. For the labour input was used the number of workers in
every year, while materials and services were obtained applying to the accounting
values industry-specific producers’ price indices (three digit). For the capital input much
problems arise. It has been considered a flow indicating the participation cost to
production. With regard to the deflation process of the fixed asset stock and of the
depreciation fund, it has been adopted the perpetual inventory method, applying
accurate estimates of the average depreciation percentage and the rate of reward for
physical and financial capital (see appendix A).
As control variables, industry business cycle and average size of the firms have
been used (Nickell, 1996). The cycle measure has been obtained by considering the
index number, with basis 1983, of the industry gross product. The size has been
calculated as the number of workers for the first year of the time series in each firm.
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This approach tends to consider the different impact of the initial conditions in terms of
dimension and can be interpreted as an explained fixed effect.
5. The econometric model
The basic hypothesis of this work is that an improvement in productivity can be
occurred before actual privatisation takes place, in the so called run-up period. This fat
can be due to a substantially shift in the incentive mechanism that regulates the
management activity, as shown in the first section of this work.
Using a panel of Italian large firms, the intent is to estimate a Cobb-Douglas
production function with constant returns to scale (CRS). Successively this restriction
will be relaxed. In particular this study refers on the econometric model contained in the
empirical works of Nickell, Wadhwani and Wall (1992), Nickell (1996) and Nickell,
Nicolitsas and Dryden (1997). A similar model was adopted by Bertero and Rondi
(2000) for the Italian case, with the aim of analysing the impact of financial pressure on
the performance of public firms under a harder budget control regime.
The basic model in the log-linear form is:
yit = 0+i+Lnit+Ccit+(1-L-C)kit+1cicljt+2sizei+1timet
 +2ANTEPRIVit+3POSTPRIVit+	it [5.1]
where 0 is a constant common to all the observations, i is the general specific-firm
effect, yit is the log of real sales, nit is the log of employment, cit is the log of the real
cost of materials and services, kit is the log of real capital cost, i is the firm subscript, t is
the time subscript, cicljt is the business cycle of the j-th industry, which the i-th firm
belongs to, sizei is the fixed dimension variable, timet captures the time effect
interpreted as technical progress, for each period, and is represented by series of integer
values from 1 to Ti15. In order to consider the pre-privatisation and the post-privatisation
effects, two dummies variables have been inserted, ANTEPRIV and POSTPRIV. The
former assumes value 1 for the four years preceding the change of ownership16 (0
otherwise)17, while the latter assumes value 1 for all the years subsequent the
                                                
15 Obviously, the integer value 1 is associated only to 1983 as well as 2 is associated to year 1984. In
this way the estimate takes into account the nature of unbalanced panel.
16 This choice of four years is justified by the structure of the dataset and by practical reasons. As
asserted by Parker and Martin (1995), p. 207, “The decision to take four years averages was
determined by the need to smooth out years of atypical performance, while at the same time avoiding
long periods when performance changes could be affected by other factors than privatisation”.
17 A model with an anticipation effect over 3 years was as well conducted, providing similar results.
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privatisation. These two dummies capture the structural shifts in performance levels,
relative respectively to the periods before (ANTEPRIV) and after (POSTPRIV)
privatisation.
In a second phase, the interacted variables timet*ANTEPRIV and timet*POSTPRIV
have been considered. While the first model allows only for a structural change on the
constant term, the second one is more general since it permits of pointing out changes in
the dynamic of the productivity. For instance, if the coefficient of timet*ANTEPRIV or
timet*POSTPRIV is positive, this will mean that productivity increases over time more
markedly respectively in the run-up period or in the post-privatisation period than
otherwise. On the contrary, negative coefficients indicate that the performance increases
less, over time, in the periods considered, or even declines. Furthermore, a comparison
between the coefficients of the two interaction variables is made possible so as to check
which time period prevails in term of performance trend.
Finally, labour input has been considered with more care because of its
importance in improving productivity, as demonstrated in many empirical and
theoretical papers focused on comparison between public and private control (Fraquelli
and Erbetta, 2000; Fraquelli, 2001, for the Italian context). First, some descriptive
statistics are computed with regard to the evolution of labour productivity across the
three time periods: State control, run-up of privatisation (four years before
privatisation)18 and post-privatisation. Afterwards, econometric estimates are presented
seeking to capture the variation in output-employment elasticity over the investigated
phases. The model, with CRS restriction, successively dropped, is as follows19:
yit = 0+i+Lnit+2 nit*ANTEPRIV+3 nit*POSTPRIV+Ccit
 +(1-L-C)kit +1cicljt+2sizei+1timet+	it [5.2]
The interacted variables nit*ANTEPRIV and nit*POSTPRIV allow the output-
employment elasticity to vary across the three periods identified.
6. Results
The main results are presented in table 2. In order to provide some test of
robustness, alternative models are specified. In column (I) a basic specification is
                                                
18 The same statistics were controlled using a run-up limited to three years. The results are substantially
identical.
19 The model was estimated with an anticipation effect over 3 years, providing similar results.
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presented without interacted variables and with CRS restriction. In column (II) the same
model is estimated using a two way fixed effects panel technique, that is firm-specific
and time-specific terms20. The basic equation is treated by relaxing the Cobb-Douglas
CRS restriction in column (III). In column (IV) interacted variables are added with CRS
hypothesis, while in column (V) this hypothesis is dropped. Columns (VI) considers the
same model as in column (IV) excluding business cycle and size. As shown below these
control variables are not statistically significant.
All the production factors labour (nit), materials (cit) and capital (kit) have, as
expected, positive coefficients and are statistically significant at 1% level, in each
specification of the model. Business cycle and fixed size show very insignificant
parameters. Thus, these control variables seem to play no role in the definition of
productivity. With regard to this evidence the final column of table 2 drops their
explanatory function. The time effect, as proxy of technical progress, is highly
significant at 1% level and assumes values of about 2%. This result is certainly
rationale, especially when dealing with long time series such these used in this work.
The main focus is oriented to studying the anticipation effect of privatisation, as
opposed to the more usual comparison between the periods before and after change of
ownership. Some theoretical arguments and empirical studies, both for the Italian and
foreign cases, shed light on feasible improvement of productivity in the run-up of
privatisation or when the constraint regime shift from a soft to a hard form. The
outcomes collected in table 2 underline positive and quite stable coefficients for the
ownership dummy ANTEPRIV, ranging from 5% to 9%. The estimates are also
statistically significant at 5% or 10%. So the years immediately before privatisation
seem to considerably affect the performance level. POSTPRIV dummy even assumes
positive values of about 4% but they are not statistically significant. No significance is,
finally, associated with the interacted variables, so demonstrating a substantial
invariance in productivity trends across the different phases here considered.
                                                
20 The fixed effects technique is adopted since there is no reason to assume that the regressor is
uncorrelated with firm-specific effects.
Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N° 11/2001
20
Table 2 – Estimates of the Productivity Equation 1
    Dependent variable: yit
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
BASIC EQUATION
 (I)
TWO WAYS FIXED EFFECTS
(II)
BASIC  EQ.
DROP OF CRS RESTR.
(III)
INTERACTED VARIABLES
(IV)
INTERACTED VARIABLES
DROP OF CRS RESTR.
(V)
INTERACTED VARIABLE
EXCLUDING CYCLE AND SIZE
(VI)
nit
0.215 (***)
(4.748)
0.203 (***)
(4.411)
0.172  (***)
(2.875)
0.210 (***)
(4.568)
0.163 (***)
(2.710)
0.210 (***)
(4.593)
cit
0.666 (***)
(25.447)
0.669 (***)
(24.964)
0.664 (***)
(25.344)
0.667 (***)
(25.167)
0.666 (***)
(25.129)
0.666 (***)
(25.308)
kit 0.119 (***)(3.447)
0.128 (***)
(3.649)
0.113 (***)
(3.250)
0.123 (***)
(3.398)
0.114 (***)
(3.110)
0.124 (***)
(3.465)
cicljt -0.0003(0.501)
-0.0001
(-0.268)
-0.0002
(-0.365)
-0.0002
(-0.407)
-0.0002
(-0.297)
sizei -0.000004(0.114)
-0.000003
(-0.098)
-0.000004
(-0.127)
-0.000008
(-0.243)
-0.000009
(-0.262)
time 0.019 (***)(5.019)
0.018 (***)
(4.943)
0.019 (***)
(4.324)
0.020 (***)
(4.395)
0.019 (***)
(4.618)
ANTEPRIV 0.045 (**)(1.994)
0.041 (*)
(1.746)
0.044 (**)
(1.952)
0.089 (*)
(1.850)
0.094 (**)
(1.944)
0.088 (*)
(1.840)
POSTPRIV 0.041(1.134)
0.043
(1.121)
0.035
(0.958)
0.049
(0.720)
0.057
(0.830)
0.046
(0.677)
timet*ANTEPRIV -0.005(-0.994)
-0.005
(-1.148)
-0.004
(-0.972)
timet*POSTPRIV -0.0005(-0.094)
-0.002
(-0.333)
-0.0001
(-0.024)
The estimates relative to the constant term are omitted, but these are in most cases significant.
t-statistics are presented in round brackets.
(*) Statistically significant at the 10% level
(**) Statistically significant at the 5% level
(***) Statistically significant at the 1% level
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All final results remain unchanged if the CRS Cobb-Douglas restriction is
dropped out, as shown in columns III and V in table 2.
When concentrating on labour productivity, table 3a highlights, as in earlier
empirical investigations, an upwards shift over the years preceding privatisation, and a
decline in the following period. The greater labour productivity in the second period
considered is associated with a higher standard deviation, so revealing a reorganisation
effort, characteristic of such a period of transition. Table 3b, instead, collects the
estimates of the Cobb-Douglas production function (2). Column (I) uses a basic model
in which CRS is imposed, column (II) relaxes this constraint. When observing the basic
equation, the coefficient of nit*ANTEPRIV appears slightly higher than that of
nit*POSTPRIV, the former being significant at 5% level. There is, thus, an evidence of
greater elasticity over the run-up phase. In order to interpret these outcomes, some
difficulties arise. The elasticity term is well-demonstrated that can be written as:
[5.3]
with h=1, 2, 3 indicating the three temporal stages described above, and the capital
letters stay for original values of real sales and employment. The numerator is the
marginal product of labour, while the denominator the average product, or the labour
productivity index. To the extent that L under pre-privatisation stage and labour
productivity increase, it can be concluded that over the same period it has been achieved
a technical improvement on the marginal product.
It is again worth to note the high significance of the technological regressors but
the coefficient of nit*POSTPRIV, and of the timet variable. The results remain robust if
the model is estimated relaxing the CRS restriction.
Table 3a – Descriptive statistics on Labour Productivity (a)
STATE CONTROL
PRE-PRIVATISATION
(FOUR YEARS) POST-PRIVATISATION
AVERAGE 211 277.42 267.92
STANDARD DEVIATION 341.82 421.48 392.69
MEDIAN 135.74 177.76 182.06
1st QUARTILE 90.42 121.11 142.73
3th QUARTILE 167.76 230.15 263.30
(a) Values in millions of £
it
it
it
itL
h N
Y
N
Y
¶
¶
=b
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Table 3b – Estimates of the Productivity Equation 2
Dependent variable: Yit
Independent
Variable
WITH CRS
RESTRICTION
(I)
Without CRS Restriction
(II)
nit
0.214 (***)
(4.715)
0.166 (***)
(2.782)
nit*ANTEPRIV 0.0054 (**)(2.036)
0.0055 (**)
(2.082)
nit*POSTPRIV 0.0050(1.091)
0.0047
(1.011)
cit
0.667 (***)
(25.458)
0.666 (***)
(25.373)
kit 0.119 (***)(3.452)
0.113 (***)
(3.246)
cicljt -0.00036(-0.672)
-0.00028
(-0.524)
sizei -0.000003(-0.082)
-0.000003
(-0.098)
TIMET
0.019 (***)
(5.181)
0.018 (***)
(5.004)
The estimates relative to the constant term are omitted, but these are in most cases significant.
t-statistics are presented in round brackets:
(*) Statistically significant at the 10% level
(**) Statistically significant at the 5% level
(***) Statistically significant at the 1% level
7. Conclusion
Most of the papers in theoretical and empirical literature face the question of inter-
temporal comparison between periods before and after privatisation on the basis that
ownership itself can produce effects on the performances of the firms. There are,
however, many evidences that highlight improvements in performance before
privatisation takes actually place. This suggests that incentive mechanisms can
powerfully work for state-owned firms, especially in the run-up of privatisation or after
a shift into a harder budget control regime (Parker and Martin, 1995; Fraquelli and
Erbetta, 2000; Bertero and Rondi, 2000).
This paper is intended to study the specific pre-privatisation behaviour of a
sample of Italian large firms that underwent changes in ownership in the last decade.
The main results point out a significant and positive impact on performance level along
the four-three years before privatisation. While the technological factors are highly
significant and of the expected sign, the control variables and the post-privatisation
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dummy (POSTPRIV) are without statistical weight. The hypothesis of changes in
productivity trends was tested with the introduction of interactions between ownership
dummies and time variable. The associated coefficients are nevertheless statistically
insignificant. The outcomes maintain substantially unchanged through different models
and when the CRS restriction is relaxed.
Labour productivity and output-employment elasticity improve over the run-up
phase, so pointing out an enhancement in marginal production. Even in this case, the
results do not change when CRS hypothesis is dropped. Labour factor seems to play an
important role in explaining the recovery in performance.
In conclusion, there is some evidence that in the run-up period an incentive
mechanism of the bureaucratic behaviour of public officers can work. One reason can
be due to the perceived threat by managerial structures of removal from their office,
after privatisation occurs, so pushing these latter to reveal to the labour market their
actual capacity. In this context adverse selection mechanisms play a fundamental role.
Furthermore, financial market requires that the re-allocated assets are reorganised, so as
to guarantee positive prospective economic values. Finally, State finances can force the
management in maximising the revenues from the dismissal process.
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Appendix A
All the data were drawn from the balance sheets of the firms. When the balance sheets
were not available the annual report “Le principali società italiane”, edited by Mediobanca, was
used as alternative source.
Output (y): physical outputs multiplied by a 1983 prices. These latter are computed by
dividing the various 1983 sales by the respective quantities, for each type of output produced.
Where the physical measure was not available, the accounting values were directly deflated by
using appropriate industry-specific producers’ price indices, from the ISTAT classification
ATECO91 (three digit).
Employment (n): number of workers for each year.
Materials and services (c): cost of materials and services deflated by a specific-industry
producers’ price indices from the ISTAT classification ATECO91 (three digit). The variations
in inventories are considered.
Capital (k): deflated depreciation + deflated interests paid + deflated implicit cost of
capital. The deflated gross fixed assets (GFA) were obtained by the perpetual inventory method
(Fraquelli, 1997) starting from the 1983 value (works in progress were included). Investments
were deflated by using the general investment goods price index (ISTAT), including financial
expenses for the acquisition of the plants. Dismissals are considered at 1983 pounds, due to the
fixed assets revaluation law 72/1983. When a successive revaluation occurred in 1991, the real
dismissals after this year were corrected by the ratio (REV): revaluated FA at 1991/(revaluated
FA at 19991-revaluation at 1991). In order to calculate the real depreciation was used an
average depreciation rate for every firm, as: depreciation/fixed assets. The deflated depreciation
fund (DF) was built up starting from 1983. As in the perpetual inventory method the fund
reductions were considered at 1983 pounds and eventually corrected by REV ratio. The Net
Working Capital (NWC) is: inventories+liquidity+credits (including medium and long term
credits)-liabilities (including medium and long term liabilities). Long term funds excluded.
NWC was deflated by using the appropriate deflator index for inventory materials or
alternatively by the general consumption price index. Financial capital was computed as:
deflated GFA-deflated DF+NWC. The cost of capital was estimated as weighted average of
rates of returns on equity and finanial debts. For the public utilities characterised by stable
demand, the estimate is of 4.4%, while for industrial firms operating in riskier environments, the
estimate of 8% was adopted.
Business cycle: annual variation of the industry deflated value added (basis 1983).
Specific value added deflators were used. The source of these data is ISTAT.
Size: number of employees in the first year of the time series. It remains constant over
each firm.
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